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Abstract 
This paper discusses how income inequality developed during the current crisis in euro area 
countries, as well as the role played by each income source. Based on an extended definition of 
income – including additional components which do not appear in the standard Eurostat 
definitions – we complement the information provided by the Gini index and quantile ratios by 
computing an alternative inequality indicator, developed by Zenga (2007), and its 
decomposition by income source. While broadly confirming the distributional effect of the 
crisis documented in previous studies, we find that in specific countries the level of inequality 
appears higher when alternative measures are taken into account, and that the rise of inequality 
since 2008 has not been as modest as previous studies would suggest. The paper further looks 
at how the distribution of income has evolved during the crisis by income quantile groups (i.e. 
‘zooming-in’). The results point to varying contribution of labour income in 2011 compared to 
2007. In addition, while the impact of individual households’ characteristics shows a non-linear 
pattern across income quantile groups before the crisis, such dispersion has decreased in 2011.  
We argue that, on the basis of our analysis, not only euro area countries are “differently 
unequal” in that inequality has developed in a very peculiar way in different countries, but also 
because it needs to be tackled at a finer level of analysis. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis marked the start of a severe and protracted recession in both Europe 
and the US. A number of euro area countries experienced the deepest downturn since the Great 
Depression; at the same time, the negative growth prospects were reinforced by the sovereign debt 
crisis which triggered considerable fiscal consolidation efforts in vulnerable euro area economies. 
Not surprisingly, how these developments have affected income distribution has recently come 
back to the attention of academics and policy makers.  
Income distribution developments are often seen as mainly relevant from a social cohesion point of 
view, with negligible (if any) direct impact on economic performance. Yet, a large number of 
theoretical and empirical studies shows that income distribution does matter for subsequent 
growth. According to Alesina and Perotti (1996), highly unequal societies are characterised by 
considerable socio-political instability, as well as by high uncertainty in the protection of property 
rights, which discourage investment and inhibit growth (see also Keefer and Knack, 2002).  At the 
same time, when credit constraints are binding, a higher degree of income “polarisation” would 
result into a higher percentage of individuals in the lower tail of the distribution whose income is 
below the cost of education, thereby reducing the incentive to invest in human capital 
accumulation with ultimate detrimental effects on growth. The latter effect would be significant in 
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rich economies (see for instance Perotti 1993 and 1996), and particularly when considering that 
higher levels of inequality are normally associated with lower social and economic mobility, and 
therefore with lower investment in education generation after generation. Finally, in more unequal 
societies, interests groups are more prone to engage in rent-seeking activities which are harmful for 
growth (Perotti, 1996 and Benabou, 1996). At the same time, however, a number of studies points at 
a positive impact of inequality on growth prospects (Li and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000). According to 
this literature, when favouring the rich, inequality would spur aggregate savings and growth. 
Furthermore, a certain degree of inequality may induce individuals to increase their effort to access 
higher income levels.  
Overall, whether inequality is good or bad for growth is still a debated issue. Clearly, the answer to 
this question is not independent of the stage of economic development. According to Galor and 
Moav (2004), at earlier stages of development, physical capital is relatively scarce and therefore 
inequality would have a positive impact on growth by channelling resources towards those 
segments of the population with a higher propensity to save. The opposite would hold at later 
stages of development, in which human capital accumulation becomes the main engine of growth, 
and inequality would exacerbate the adverse effect of credit constraints on human capital 
investment and growth. At the same time, for a given level of economic development, changes in 
overall inequality – however measured – may correspond to very different scenarios, and therefore 
have very different implications for growth, depending on what portions of the income distribution 
are affected. Based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study, Voitchovsky (2005) shows that 
while top end inequality is positively related with economic performance, inequality at the bottom 
end proves to be harmful for growth.  These offsetting effects may explain the fact that sometimes 
inequality – captured by summary statistics such as the Gini coefficient – appears insignificant in 
growth equations, calling for analyses looking at a wide array of indicators at a more granular level.  
Given the significance of inequality on growth, the aim of this paper is to look at how inequality 
has evolved in euro area countries since the start of the crisis and – more importantly – to shed 
light on which portions of the income distribution are actually driving the observed dynamics. This 
has the potential to help identify common patterns across countries and to distinguish those cases 
where inequality can be considered “good” or “bad” – i.e. whether inequality is likely to be 
conducive to higher growth or unfavourably affect economic performance. This issue appears 
particularly important in the current juncture, as the shape of income distribution – in principle – 
can either reinforce the persistence of a recession phase or be among the driving forces behind a 
faster recovery.  
A growing number of empirical studies have recently explored the distributional impact of the 
crisis by focusing on a wide array of variables such as income, earnings, consumption expenditure 
and wealth (Jenkins et al.,2011; Heathcote et al., 2010; Petev et al., 2011; Perri and Steinberg,2012). In 
all of these studies, developments in income distribution are normally discussed with reference to a 
standard set of indicators, such as the average and median income, the Gini coefficient, the poverty 
rate. While undeniably useful, these indicators do not allow properly taking into account the 
relationship between the lower tail and the upper tail of the income distribution. In particular, 
Heatcote et al. (2010) present empirical results of the evolution of inequality in the United States for 
the years 1967-2006, suggesting that inequality may have several dimensions. They find that wage 
inequality presents a steady increase in the course of the years considered and that taxes and 
transfers have had an impact on the lower tail of the distribution (the poorest) but little effect on 
aggregated inequality. Perry and Steinberg (2012) explored the way the crisis has impacted 
economic inequality in the United States, analysing, among the others, earnings, disposable income, 
consumption and wealth: they argue that a more in-depth analysis on the different income levels is 
key to draw a clearer picture. Moreover, the same authors argue that redistribution policies made it 
possible to contain falloffs in consumption for the bottom quintile of the distribution.  
All these studies point to the methodological need to investigate the impact of the recent economic 
crisis along several (micro) dimensions and variables. Moreover, we believe that such an analysis 
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needs to be done within the euro area context as well, as it could assist the identification of 
common patterns or, vice versa, heterogeneous recovery dynamics. Due to the heterogeneity of the 
countries belonging to the euro area, we advocate a country-based analysis is fundamental to better 
understand how the crisis has impacted inequality developments in the Eurozone. In addition, the 
studies mentioned above suggest the need of breaking down the analysis by studying the effects of 
individual income levels and family types. That is what we propose to do in this paper. 
Based on household level data from the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the 
paper looks for alternative inequality indicators. The analysis is performed for the cross-sections 
2004 to 2011. In particular, the paper makes use of a (relatively) new (albeit, admittedly, less 
known) indicator, the Zenga index (2007), which allows to detect, with identical receptivity, 
deviations from equality in any parts of the distribution (see Section 4). The latter indicator is used 
to complement the information provided by the Gini index – thereby allowing a comparison with 
the results available in the literature. Following the approach proposed in Lerman and Yitzhaki 
(1984; 1985) and in Zenga and Radaelli (2007), the evolution of the Gini and Zenga indexes is 
further decomposed into the contribution to overall inequality coming from single income sources. 
This allows to quantitatively assess how inequality developed as a result of the economic crisis, 
especially in those economies which were more hardly hit. Beside an analysis on baseline 
disposable income, inequality is further analysed with reference to an extended income definition, 
including additional income components, some of which being particularly relevant in the current 
conjuncture. 
Despite providing an alternative income definition, the novelty of our approach, however, stands in 
looking at how the distribution of income has evolved during the crisis by income quantile groups 
(i.e. referred to as ‘zooming-in’). An analysis of income inequality as such a granular level is indeed 
made possible by the use of the Zenga index (2007) and its linearity property (see Section 4). 
Digging into inequality dynamics is key, especially since movements at different levels of the 
distribution may not necessarily translate into higher (lower) inequality overall, and in particular if 
larger movements from people in the mid into the lower end of the distribution are compensated by 
a relative depletion of people at the top end of the distribution. It is worth noting, in fact, that 
increases (decreases) of inequality measures, however defined, do not necessarily mean a 
worsening (improvement) in the distribution of income.  At one extreme, inequality may increase 
as a result of a higher share of population moving to higher income levels, the position of the lower 
tail of the distribution being unchanged. Such an outcome may be actually read as a Pareto 
improvement. Conversely, changes in inequality over time may be driven by the poorest segments 
of the population. At those extremes, policy implications would be very different.  Therefore, in 
order to be able to capture different dimensions of inequality it is necessary to take a closer look at 
i) a wider array of indicators, ii) the contribution of each income sources and iii) observe such 
contribution not only in the aggregate, but also by population sub-groups. In addition, and as 
discussed previously, previous studies have shown that the crisis has had different effects on 
income inequality in different countries. We argue that such country-specific dynamics needs to be 
brought to an even finer level of analysis. In fact, we find that the inequality dynamics, and 
particularly pre- and post-crisis comparisons, are extremely articulated. Our analysis based on the 
decomposition of different indexes by sources, shows quite clearly that inequality patterns are 
specific to each country/source/income level combination. In particular, the results suggest that the 
distributional impact of the crisis has evolved in quite different ways in several countries and 
‘zooming-in’ may help capture some of this heterogeneity. We argue that, on the basis of our 
analysis, not only euro area countries are “differently unequal” in that inequality has developed in a 
very peculiar way in different countries, but also because it needs to be tackled at a finer level of 
analysis. In this respect, redistribution policies need to be fine-tuned along these lines, rather than 
addressing the problem from an aggregate viewpoint. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 outline the main features of the 
dataset and possible statistical issues; they further discuss the extended income definition used in 
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the paper. Section 4 introduces the alternative inequality indicator (Zenga, 2007) and presents its 
methodological decomposition, compared to the Gini index. Section 5 outlines the main results, by 
further tackling the distributional impact of the crisis for specific income levels. Section 6 
concludes.   
 
2.  Data 
 
We use net income flows data from the Eurostats Survey of Income and Living Conditions for 12 
euro area countries over the period 2004-2011, allowing to cover the period immediately preceding 
the financial crisis and the following economic downturn. The euro area countries considered are 
(in alphabetical order): Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), 
Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal 
(PT).2  
The EU-SILC provides the longest time series of comparable and consistently defined individual 
level data for income and living conditions available for the euro area. One of the attractive features 
of the EU-SILC, compared to other surveys, is that it provides not only details on each individual 
and households’ characteristics (i.e. family composition, etc.), but also information on the level of 
household income and measures of households’ wealth such as households’ ability to face 
unexpected financial expenses, mortgage burden, etc. Cross-sectional data are available for total 
household gross and net income. Table 1 further clarifies the difference between gross and net 
incomes. The former is defined as the sum for all household’s members of gross personal income 
components (gross employee cash or near cash income) plus gross income components at 
household level. Net (or disposable) income equals gross income minus tax (including “Regular 
taxes on wealth”, “Regular inter-household cash transfer paid” and “Tax on income and social 
insurance contributions”; see Table 1). Income is available for almost all countries over the whole 
sample period (for Ireland the last available wave in the EU-SILC was 2010). Summary statistics on 
the data employed (gross and net incomes) are reported in Table 1A (Annex 1). The only restriction 
imposed to the data is that observations for which income sources are available should report total 
incomes as well, and vice versa. Yet, this leaves a consistent number of observations.3 In the 
following sections, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized onto pre-crisis averages 
(2005-07). Normalizing income is useful to deal with the fact that inequality may have been 
characterized as “bubbly” in the pre-crisis period in some countries. For further comparisons, the 
results for inequality indexes over the whole sample period 2004-11 are anyway provided in Annex 
1 (Figure 1A), where available.   
Comparing income inequality across countries requires the use of scaling factors, which weight 
households’ income according to their composition. The household weighting scheme adopted here 
is based on equivalence scales measures. The intuition behind using weighting schemes is that of 
accounting for income to grow within each additional household member in a non-proportional 
way (see Atkinson et al., 1995; World Bank, 2002). Following a standard practice, we rely on the 
OECD-modified scale assuming, for instance, that a household of two adults and two children has 
different needs (e.g., roughly twice as much) as one composed of a single person. While this choice 
clearly depends on technical assumptions about economies of scale, as well as on judgments about 
the priority assigned to the needs of different individuals – such as children or the elderly – it also 
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Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Portugal (PT)) and “northern countries” (Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), the Netherlands (NL)). 
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allows comparability with other studies and official publications (e.g., Eurostat). In this way, each 
household type in the population is assigned a value in proportion to its (assumed) produced 
income, mainly taking into account the size of the household and the age of its members – whether 
they are adults or children (see OECD, 2008; 2011).  
For each household, total disposable and gross incomes are imputed consistently with the 
underlying income components, as described by the Eurostat’s EU-SILC User Guide. In order to 
allow for a decomposition of total income (either gross or net) by components, income sources are 
partitioned according to (cash and non-cash) labour income, cash transfers, other sources of income, and 
direct taxes (the latter for net income, only). Within the labour income component, we further 
distinguish among income from employment, income from self-employment and non-cash labour 
income. Following Jenkins et al. (2011) we define cash transfers, including all cash benefits from the 
government plus transfers (such as state retirement pensions), and other income sources (mainly 
including income from investment and savings).4,5 
 
Table 1 – Income definitions  
 
D
is
p
os
ab
le
 in
co
m
e 
(n
et
) 
 
In
co
m
e 
(g
ro
ss
) 
Paper definition of disposable income EU-SILC definitions 
 
Labour income Gross employee cash or near cash income  
Labour income from  
self-employment 
Gross cash benefits or losses from self- 
employment (including royalties) 
Non-cash labour income Company car (from 2007, before it is gross non-cash 
employee income, see Eurostat)  
Cash tranfers 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Unemployment benefits 
Old-age benefits  
Survivor' benefits 
Sickness benefits 
Disability benefits 
Education-related allowances  
Family/children related allowances  
Social exclusion not elsewhere classified 
Housing allowances 
Regular inter-household cash transfers received 
Income received by people aged under 16  
Other income 
  
  
Income from rental of a property or land  
Interests, dividends, profit from capital  
investments  in unincorporated business  
Pensions received from individual private plans  
(other than those covered under ESSPROS) 
Interests on Mortgages Interest paid on mortgage  
 
Taxes 
  
  
Regular taxes on wealth 
Regular inter-household cash transfer paid 
Tax on income and social insurance contributions  
Note: Sources entering extended income definition are in bold. 
                                                 
4 A residual component is included in order to ensure consistency between aggregate income (whether gross or net) 
and individual income sources. Importantly, the residual component represents the part of income which is not 
accounted for by the available income decomposition sources in the EU-SILC. While we take the residual into account 
for the sake of consistency and transparency of the results, we did some robustness checks to show that this residual is 
irrelevant in the income decomposition exercise for most countries. This check is not reported here for sake of brevity. 
The results are however available upon request from the authors. For a technical discussion see Annex 2.    
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In addition, and given the availability of new income components, the analysis focuses on an 
extended income definition. The rationale behind referring to a wider definition of income is that of 
accounting for additional income sources which may have played a non-negligible role in 
households’ balances, particularly during the last cycle. The additional income sources relevant to 
this extension are (i) pensions received from individual private plans (other than those covered 
under the European System of integrated Social Protection Statistics - ESSPROS) and (ii) interests 
paid on mortgages, treated here as negative income source. Further details about the extended 
income definition are provided in Table 1. In our analysis, the component of interests on mortgage 
is intentionally kept separate from other income sources, in order to highlight the effect of 
mortgages on private sector’s leveraging in some countries.  
 
3. Standard indicators of inequality 
 
By looking at the standard array of inequality indicators adopted in the literature, the evolution of 
the Gini index over time (Figure 1) shows that, since the crisis, inequality initially declined in some 
countries. In most cases, inequality started rising again during the period of analysis, well above (as 
in the case of Spain and Ireland) or very close (e.g., in Greece and Italy) to the levels observed 
before the start of the crisis. The case of France stands alone, with inequality systematically 
increasing over the entire sample. The opposite dynamics are recorded in Germany and the 
Netherlands, with inequality overall trending lower starting from 2008. The after-crisis picture of 
inequality remained broadly stable in all other countries. 
 
Figure 1 – GINI Index - after-tax (OECD-equivalent) income  
 
 
Note: Countries are clustered according to “program and vulnerable countries” (Cyprus (CY), Spain (ES), Greece (GR), 
Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Portugal (PT)), and “northern countries” (Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), the Netherlands (NL)). Where data are available, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized 
onto pre-crisis averages (2005-07=100). 
 
Figure 2 – p90/p10 ratio - after-tax (OECD-equivalent) income  
 
 
Note: Countries are clustered according to “program and vulnerable countries” (Cyprus (CY), Spain (ES), Greece (GR), 
Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Portugal (PT)), and “northern countries” (Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Finland 
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(FI), France (FR), the Netherlands (NL)). Where data are available, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized 
onto pre-crisis averages (2005-07=100). 
 
The evolution of the income ratio of the richest and the poorest 10% of the population provides a 
broadly similar picture (Figure 2), with some notable exceptions. It should be noted, in first place, 
that the same evolution of the quantile ratio masks rather different dynamics across countries, with 
potentially different policy implications. For instance, the strong increase of the ratio in Spain 
reflects both a noticeable worsening in the lowest tail of the distribution as well as a significant 
increase of the income level of the richest (not reported here for sake of brevity). This is, for 
instance, different in France, where the observed dynamics results from an improvement in both 
segments of the population, with the richest moving towards relatively higher levels of income. 
While not accurate, a quick inspection suggests that looking at the extent of inequality among 
specific income quantiles may provide useful (and more in-depth) information about the 
homogeneity of different income strata in the population; thus, being a crucial element to consider 
when looking at the effect of policy interventions. Further, the analysis above seems to suggest the 
information provided by the quantile ratios not to be always consistent with that provided by a 
synthetic indicator such as the Gini index. In particular, by looking – again – at the case of Spain, 
the Gini index would show a mild increase in inequality in 2010-11 (+5%), while the ratio between 
the number of households in the top and the bottom quantiles increased three times as much over 
the same period, well above the value observed before the crisis. Yet again, while quantile ratios are 
very synthetic and ignore information on incomes in the middle of the distribution – nor they use 
information about the income distribution within the top and bottom quantiles – these 
developments are enough to conclude that the tails of the distribution play a relevant role; in which 
case the Gini index may not provide a reliable picture (see Section 4). 
 
Table 2 – GINI Index – before- and after-tax (OECD-equivalent) income variables  
 
  Gross income  
(extended definition) 
    Disposable income 
(extended definition) 
  2007 2011 first diff.     2007 2011 first diff. 
PT 41.8 39.1 -2.7   PT 37.3 34.8 -2.5 
IE 36.1 37.9 1.9   ES 31.4 33.2 1.8 
GR 38.2 36.4 -1.8   GR 33.6 33.0 -0.5 
IT 35.8 35.8 0.0   IE 31.0 32.8 1.9 
ES 33.7 35.0 1.3   IT 31.9 31.7 -0.1 
FR 29.7 33.7 4.0   FR 26.6 31.0 4.4 
DE 33.6 33.2 -0.4   EA average 29.0 29.1 0.0 
EA average 33.0 32.8 -0.2   DE 29.6 29.0 -0.5 
BE 31.3 31.3 0.0   AT 26.4 26.4 0.1 
AT 30.6 31.0 0.5   FI 26.1 26.3 0.1 
FI 30.7 30.3 -0.4   BE 26.1 26.1 0.0 
NL 32.0 30.0 -2.0   NL 27.0 25.1 -1.8 
 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany 
(DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal 
(PT). Countries are ranked in descending order according to Gini inequality index as measured in the latest available 
year (2011, 2010 in case of IE). 
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Table 2 finally shows the Gini coefficient computed on the gross and disposable extended incomes 
(both equivalized), as defined previously, over the periods 2007 and 2011 (2010 in the case of 
Ireland). Importantly, countries are ranked in descending order according to inequality indexes as 
measured in the latest available year.  
Not surprisingly, the level of inequality in all countries is lower when after-tax income is taken into 
account. Interestingly, however, countries’ relative position somewhat changes depending on 
whether their rank is based on gross or net income. Among euro area countries, Spain appears as 
the country with the second highest level of inequality when looking at disposable income; being 
further away from the euro area average with respect to the gross income ranking. The opposite 
holds for countries like Austria and Belgium, where redistribution policies seem to have 
significantly lowered the degree of inequality compared to the euro area average.6 Putting all 
different pieces together, inequality developments are more complex than what a synthetic 
indicator can capture. Hence, a more granular analysis may add up to our understanding of such 
complexity. This is the purpose of our next sections. 
 
4. Methodology  
 
In order to analyze the dynamics of the contribution of each income source to the overall 
inequality, we outline two different inequality indexes and their decompositions by income 
sources: the Gini and the Zenga index. We will show that, while the decomposition of both 
indexes provide insightful information on the inequality dynamics by income sources, the Zenga 
(2007) index presents the additional advantage of allowing to quantify the role of  population sub-
groups, hence ‘zooming-in’ on the distribution of income before and during the crisis. Importantly, 
since our analysis is concerned with distributional issues, and given the great importance 
proportional tax, inter-households transfer and contribution to social security play for inequality, 
the remainder of the analysis focuses on disposable income only.7  
4.1 Measuring inequality: a comparison  
 
The Gini index is, probably, the most used and well-known index in the literature on income 
inequality (see Gini, 1914), and its specifications are several (see Yitzhaki, 1997). As anticipated 
before, however, the Gini index often fails to take into account the effective impact of the right tail 
of the income distribution (i.e. the richest) with respect to the left part of the tail (i.e. the poorest). 
As we showed in the previous section, quantile ratios represent a way to capture  the fundamental 
idea that the concepts of poor and rich are relative to each other. In order to cope with this problem 
along all the possible fractions of lowest (highest) incomes in the distribution, Zenga (2007) more 
recently proposed an inequality index based on the ratio between lower and upper arithmetic 
means. While we are not necessarily interested in introducing the Zenga index in itself, we are 
interested in its empirical application, especially with a view to measure inequality in relative terms, 
compared to a standard index such as Gini. In this setting, the assessment of inequality in the 
population is determined by the comparison of population sub–groups. The Gini index compares 
the left tail of the income distribution (the poorest) with the whole population by attributing a 
weight proportional to the population share. On the contrary, the Zenga (2007) index compares 
each disjoint sub-group using the same weight for each comparison; hence allowing for a better 
comparison for each sub-group (including a better assessment of the right part of the income 
distribution, i.e. the richest).  
More formally, let 𝑖 = (1, … , 𝑁) be the households in the population and 𝑠 = (1, … , S) be the 
possible sources of income. It is then possibile to define an income matrix 𝐘, such that the element 
                                                 
6 While changes in public policies may be relevant in changing economic inequality, to assess idiosyncratic tax reforms 
and their re-distributive effects is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
7
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𝑦𝑖𝑠 represents the income of household 𝑖 given source 𝑠. The variable 𝑦𝑖 = ∑  
𝑆
𝑠=1 𝑦𝑖𝑠 thus represents 
the total income for household 𝑖. Moving to the income source dimension, we will further assume 
each column vector to represent the sources, and that total income is a random variable in a simple 
linear relationship. Let us denote total income as 𝑌 and the single variables representing the income 
sources as 𝑦𝑠, then:  
𝑌 = ∑  
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑦𝑠 
 
Without loss of generality, we will assume for the remainder of this section that total incomes are 
ordered such that 0 ≤ 𝑦1 ≤ 𝑦2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑦𝑖 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑦𝑁 (with at least one strictly positive observation). 
Let the mean (total) income be denoted by 𝜇𝑌 = 1/𝑁 ∑  
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑖 and the mean income for each income 
source denotes as 𝜇𝑦𝑠 = 1/𝑁 ∑  
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑖𝑠. The decomposition by income sources proposed for both 
indexes is then derived by applying the linearity property of the covariance – for the Gini index – 
and the arithmetic mean – for the Zenga index. As discussed earlier, the Gini index presents some 
limitation when it comes to the relationship between the left tail (the poorest) and the right tail 
(the richest) of the income distribution. In fact, it is computed by averaging, for each quantile of the 
distribution (cumulated fraction of household), the sum of incomes along the left tail (cumulated 
income for that quantile), and then comparing it to the mean income of the whole population. As 
such, the Gini index underestimates the effect of the very poor with respect to the whole 
population (and the very rich) and stresses comparison between sub–groups that are more similar. 
We are interested instead in a measure that can capture the increasing distance between the 
richest and the poorest parts of the population. That is where the alternative Zenga index comes 
into play (see Zenga, 2007). The index works as follows: for each element (household income level) 
𝑖, let 𝑀
−
𝑖 =
1
𝑖
∑  𝑖𝑗=1 𝑌𝑗  be the lower mean for the income level 𝑖 (i.e. the mean of the sub–group poorer 
than 𝑖) and 𝑀
+
𝑖 =
1
𝑁−𝑖
∑  𝑁𝑗=𝑖+1 𝑌𝑗  be the upper mean for the income level 𝑖 (i.e. the mean of the sub–
group richer than 𝑖). The point inequality for the income level 𝑖 is then defined as:  
 𝐼𝑖 =
𝑀
+
𝑖−𝑀
−
𝑖
𝑀
+
𝑖
= 1 −  
𝑀
−
𝑖
𝑀
+
𝑖
 (1) 
 
which captures the relative variation of the lower mean with respect to the upper mean. 
The overall inequality index 𝐼 is then computed by averaging 𝐼𝑖 over all observations:  
 
 𝐼 =
1
𝑁
∑  𝑁𝑖=1 𝐼𝑖 =
1
𝑁
∑  𝑁𝑖=1
𝑀
+
𝑖−𝑀
−
𝑖
𝑀
+
𝑖
 (2) 
 
The properties of the curve 𝐼𝑖 have been studied in Zenga (2007) and Greselin et al. (2009). As 
mentioned previously, due to its construction, the Zenga index allows for a comparison between 
each possible disjoint subgroup in the distribution. The intuition is that an increase in income for 
the richest (1 − 𝑝) fraction of the population will have an effect on the value of the inequality curve 
for the fraction of the 𝑝 poorest. In the next section, we will show how the Zenga decomposition 
follows and how changes in the distribution of inequality by population sub-groups work.  
4.2 Inequality indexes decomposition 
 
Among the many ways to compute the Gini index, we refer to the geometric approach, based on the 
Lorenz curve 𝐿(𝑝), which computes the Gini coefficient 𝐺𝑌 as follows:  
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𝐺𝑌 = 1 − 2 ∫  
1
0
𝐿(𝑝)𝑑𝑝 =
𝐵.𝑃.
 
= 2 ∫  
1
0
𝑝𝐿′(𝑝)𝑑𝑝 − 1 
  
where the last integral has been computed integrating by parts. Given two random variables 𝑋 and 
𝑍, let:  
 𝐺𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑍) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝐹𝑍(𝑧)) 
 
be the so-called Gini covariance between 𝑋 and 𝑍. The Gini covariance differs from the standard 
covariance in that it does not measure the degree of linearity between two variables, but the degree of 
monotonicity, making it suitable for capturing non-linear (yet monotonical) relationships. This 
formulation will allow to express the Gini coefficient in terms of covariance with its rankings.  
After some algebra, it is possible to express the Gini index in terms of Gini covariance between the 
income variable 𝑌 and its fractional rankings, expressed in terms of its distribution function 𝐹𝑌(𝑦) =
𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑦), as follows:  
 
 𝐺𝑌 =
2
𝜇𝑌
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑌, 𝐹𝑌(𝑦)) 
 
by considering the uniform random variable 𝐹𝑌(𝑦) = 𝑝. The simple linearity property for the 
covariance of two variables leads us to write:  
 
𝐺𝑌 =
2
𝜇𝑌
∑  
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑦𝑠𝐺𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑠, 𝑌) 
=
2
𝜇𝑌
∑  
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑠, 𝐹𝑌(𝑦)) 
 
which represents the Gini coefficient in terms of the covariance of source 𝑠 with the fractional 
rankings of the total income. Normalizing by 𝐺𝑌 gives the relative contribution of source 𝑠 to the 
global income inequality.  
De Vergottini (1950) identified a relationship between Gini’s mean difference and the covariance. 
This concept is at the basis of the decomposition proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984; 1985). 
The latter authors show how the Gini coefficient can be rewritten by multiplying and dividing each 
income component 𝑠 by the covariance between the same income component 𝑦𝑠 and its cumulative 
distribution function, and by further multiplying and diving it by 𝜇𝑦𝑠, as follows:  
  (3) 
𝐺𝑌 =
2
𝜇𝑌
∑  
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑠, 𝐹(𝑌))
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑠, 𝐹𝑦𝑠)
  
2𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑠, 𝐹(𝑦𝑠))
𝜇𝑌𝑠
  
𝜇𝑦𝑠
𝜇𝑌
 
=
2
𝜇𝑌
∑  
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑅𝑦𝑠𝐺𝑦𝑠  𝑊𝑦𝑠  
 
Expression (3) is a useful way to present income inequality as the sum of the product of three 
quantities: 𝑅𝑦𝑠 being the Gini correlation between income source 𝑦𝑠 and the total income, 𝐺𝑦𝑠  being 
the Gini index for the income component 𝑦𝑠, and 𝑊𝑦𝑠 being the share of total income due to income 
component 𝑦𝑠. While this Gini representation is standard, it is nonetheless necessary to 
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understand comparisons with the alternative indicator employed (the Zenga index; see Zenga, 
2007) and how the latter add up to a more-comprehensive analysis of inequality.  
Zenga et al. (2012) proposed a point decomposition by sources which exploits the simple linearity 
property of the arithmetic mean of the distribution: the arithmetic mean of a linear combination of 
variables is the same linear combination of the arithmetic means of each variable. In other words, 
we can rewrite the lower and upper means of the distribution appearing in (1) and (2), as follows:  
 
𝑀
−
𝑖 =
1
𝑖
∑  
𝑖
𝑗=1
∑  
𝑠
𝑠=1
𝑦𝑗𝑠 = ∑  
𝑠
𝑠=1
∑  
𝑖
𝑗=1
1
𝑖
𝑦𝑗𝑠 = ∑  
𝑠
𝑠=1
𝑀
−
𝑖𝑠 
  (4) 
𝑀
+
𝑖 =
1
𝑁 − 𝑖
∑  
𝑁
𝑗=𝑖+1
∑  
𝑠
𝑠=1
𝑦𝑗𝑠 = ∑  
𝑠
𝑠=1
∑  
𝑁
𝑗=𝑖+1
1
𝑁 − 𝑖
𝑦𝑗𝑠 = ∑  
𝑠
𝑠=1
𝑀
+
𝑖𝑠 
 
Where 𝑀
+
𝑖𝑠 and 𝑀
+
𝑖𝑠 are, respectively, the upper and lower means for income group 𝑖 with respect to 
source 𝑠. In the light of the above, equation (2) is rewritten as:  
 
𝐼 =
1
𝑁
∑  
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐼𝑖 =
1
𝑁
∑  
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑀
+
𝑖 − 𝑀
−
𝑖
𝑀
+
𝑖
= 
=
1
𝑁
∑  
𝑆
𝑠=1
∑  
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑀
+
𝑖𝑠 − 𝑀
−
𝑖𝑠
𝑀
+
𝑖
=
1
𝑁
∑  
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝐼𝑠 
 
where 𝐼𝑠 = ∑  
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑀
+
𝑖𝑠−𝑀
−
𝑖𝑠
𝑀
+
𝑖
 is the contribution of income source 𝑠 to global inequality. It is then 
possible to compute the relative contribution of each source to global inequality by writing: 𝛽𝑠 =
𝐼𝑠
𝐼
 
(with ∑  𝑠 𝐼𝑠 = 1). In the same vein, an inequality index can be computed for different segments of 
the population, by exploiting the linear representation of the Zenga index (see Radaelli, 2010). 
 
4.3 Sample correction weights 
 
When dealing with the estimation of inequality indexes from survey-based data, it is important to 
take into account sample weights. For the Gini index, the fundamental problem is to correctly 
compute weight-based fractional rankings (see Van Kerm, 2009). On the contrary, and less trivially 
so, for the Zenga index we will need to introduce its computation in a frequency distribution 
framework (see also Zenga, 2007).  
In particular, let (𝑦𝑖, 𝑤𝑖)𝑖=1
𝑁  be the representation of the 𝑁 observations with the respective 
sampling weights and let 0 ≠ 𝑦1
∗, … , 𝑦𝐾, … , 𝑦𝐾
∗  (with 𝐾 ≤ 𝑁) be the unique observations of (𝑦𝑖)𝑖=1
𝑁 . 
In order to compute the new fractional rankings, associated with the 𝐾 unique values, tied values 
must be considered (see Van Kerm, 2009). Once fractional rankings are computed, they can be 
directly used in Equation (3).  
Let 𝑛ℎ be the frequencies associated to each unique observation 𝑦ℎ
∗ , where ∑  ℎ 𝑛ℎ = 𝑛, with 𝑛 
being the total number of observation (e.g. the total number of inhabitants of a country) or, in other 
terms, 𝑛 = ∑  𝑖 𝑤𝑖 = ∑  ℎ 𝑛ℎ. Let 𝑁ℎ = ∑  
ℎ
𝑡=1 𝑛𝑡  be the cumulative frequencies and 𝑝ℎ =
𝑁ℎ
𝑛
 be the 
cumulative relative frequencies. We can now define the low and upper means with respect to the 
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cumulative relative frequencies 𝑝ℎ: 𝑀
−
𝑝ℎ =
1
𝑁ℎ
∑  ℎ𝑡=1 𝑦𝑡
∗𝑛𝑡  and 𝑀
+
𝑝ℎ =
1
𝑛−𝑁ℎ
∑  𝐾𝑡=ℎ+1 𝑦𝑡
∗𝑛𝑡. 
Analogously to Equation (1), the point inequality index for level 𝑝ℎ is then given by:  
 
 𝐼𝑝ℎ =
𝑀
+
𝑝ℎ
−𝑀
−
𝑝ℎ
𝑀
+
𝑝ℎ
 (5) 
 
whereas the synthetic index is: 
 
 𝐼 =
1
𝑛
∑  𝐾ℎ=1 𝐼𝑝ℎ𝑛ℎ (6) 
 
Equation (6) is a weighted average of the point inequality indexes where weights are computed 
from the sampling weights. The latter computation is performed as follows: 
 
 𝑛ℎ = ∑  
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖l{𝑦ℎ
∗ = 𝑦𝑖} ⇔ 𝑝ℎ =
1
∑  𝑖 𝑤𝑖
∑  𝑁𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖1{𝑦ℎ
∗ = 𝑦𝑖}, (7) 
 
where l{⋅} is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 whenever 𝑦ℎ
∗ = 𝑦𝑖 . 
 
5 Results 
 
In this section we look at the extent of inequality across countries and over time based on the two 
inequality measures set out above. Particularly, we try to understand how alternative inequality 
measures, capturing with different receptivity deviations from equality in different parts of the 
distribution, fare in practice. In Section 5.2 the analysis focuses instead on the inequality of 
different income sources, following the decomposition set out in the previous Section. 
   
5.1 A quick comparison between inequality indexes  
 
Figures 3 plots the aggregate income inequality constructed from the standard Gini coefficient, as 
well as the Zenga coefficient, normalized on pre-2008 periods, and based on our extended income 
definition. For sake of comparability, we leave in the same chart the Gini and Zenga indexes based 
on standard income definition, where pensions received from individual private plans and interest 
on mortgage do not appear (see Table 1). Having the pre-2008 period as a benchmark is the result 
of both judgment on the observed labor market slack in 2008 (i.e. labor markets reacted with some 
lag to the real economic downturn) and practical considerations (i.e. 2007 is the first available year 
for some countries). Moreover, we assume 2008 to be a sensible choice for survey data as it may 
take some time for individuals to gauge their reduced income availability at the household level – 
especially in the light of real public social spending effectively growing as of 2008-09 (as a 
percentage of GDP) in many euro area countries (see OECD, 2012).  
The two indexes produce qualitatively a similar picture, albeit normalizing the two indexes on 
(own) pre-2008 averages show a substantial scale difference. As stressed earlier, the Gini index 
may however underestimate comparisons between the very poor (left-tailed) and the whole 
population, while emphasizing comparisons which involve almost identical population subgroups. 
Against the backdrop of a fall in real GDP in 2009 (see OECD, 2012), inequality seemed to have 
increased in most countries, independently of which index is regarded. However, in some 
countries, such as Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, the Zenga indicator has decreased less in pre-
2008 terms (=100) compared to Gini, suggesting that the rise of inequality since 2008 has not been 
as modest as previous studies would suggest. On the contrary, the Zenga index, vis-à-vis Gini, tends 
to be generally lower for Germany and France, whereas a clear picture does not emerge for Belgium, 
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Cyprus, Finland and the Netherlands, as the two indexes cross each other at different points of the 
sample. 
Moreover, compared to the baseline income definitions, we show that considering extended 
income variables does not generally change the scale of the evolution of Zenga and Gini inequality 
in most countries (Figure 3). However, somewhat different patterns are observed in Belgium, 
Spain, Finland, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands.   By construction of the two indexes, this 
implies that some of the new variables considered may favour one tail of the distribution more than 
the other, having an (un)equalizing effect on total income inequality. At this stage the 
interpretation of the results is certainly challenging and can be better dealt with an analysis of 
different income categories.  However, it is intuitive to assert that such developments are likely to 
be observed when income components have important (un-)equalizing effects, especially 
decreasing (increasing) inequality between the lower end and the middle of the distribution. 
 
Figure 3 – Zenga and Gini coefficients - net income vs. net extended income 
 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), 
Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), 
Portugal (PT). Where data is available, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized onto pre-crisis averages 
(2005-07=100). 
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Figure 3 (continued) – Zenga and Gini coefficients - net income vs. net extended income 
 
 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), 
Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), 
Portugal (PT). Where data are available, the evolution of inequality is presented normalized onto pre-crisis averages 
(2005-07=100). 
 
5.2 Decomposition of inequality by income sources 
 
In order to get deeper into the drivers of the inequality developments discussed above, we quantify 
the extent to which total income inequality (measured by the Zenga index) is explained by single 
income sources (Table 3);  see Zenga et al. (2012).8 It emerges that, between 2008 and 2010, the 
(positive) contribution of income from employment to overall inequality declined in all countries 
except in Ireland and, to a lesser extent, in Cyprus and Finland. Although less sizeable compared to 
dependent employment, the contribution from self-employment also declined in all countries 
(except Austria). At the same time, however, the share on total income of payment for direct taxes 
remained high while the share of interests on mortgage has been quantitatively smaller (i.e. again, 
                                                 
8
 For a discussion see Annex 2. 
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taxes and interests on mortgages are treated as negative income sources). Further, the 
contributions of the latter two declined over time.  
Clearly, if an income source represents a large share on total income (and this varies over time), it 
may have – in principle – a strong effect on inequality. However, the extent to which this is likely 
to affect inequality as a whole depends on the equality of the individual source itself. We start by 
looking at the pre-crisis (2005-2007). Total inequality is explained in order of importance by 
labour income, income from self-employment, other income, cash transfer (with the exceptions of 
France, Greece, Italy and Portugal, where cash transfers rank as third income source and, compared 
to the other countries, explains a much higher share of total inequality). 
 
Table 3 – Contribution of income sources – net extended income (Zenga index=100) 
 
    2005-2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
AT Labour income 98.8 110.4 106.4 112.7 105.4 
  Self-empl. lab. income 21.2 17.4 22.9 21.0 19.2 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Cash transfers 21.2 16.9 15.5 12.7 17.0 
  Other income (ext) 6.3 9.5 7.2 8.8 10.1 
  Interests on mortg. -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 
  Taxes -47.4 -53.6 -51.3 -54.7 -51.5 
BE Labour income 128.7 118.7 125.9 122.3 129.4 
  Self-empl. lab. income 16.6 22.5 13.7 11.7 16.0 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 
  Cash transfers -4.4 -3.9 -1.2 0.7 -4.7 
  Other income (ext) 12.8 9.3 9.7 12.9 9.0 
  Interests on mortg. -1.6 -1.6 -1.8 -2.0 -2.2 
  Taxes -52.9 -45.9 -47.5 -46.7 -49.5 
CY Labour income 89.7 88.5 88.5 92.7 91.6 
  Self-empl. lab. income 12.6 15.3 13.0 12.4 11.0 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  Cash transfers 4.8 5.4 9.2 8.4 8.5 
  Other income (ext) 9.1 7.6 7.2 5.9 7.6 
  Interests on mortg. -0.4 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.1 
  Taxes -16.3 -16.2 -16.9 -18.4 -18.8 
DE Labour income 101.5 101.7 107.8 110.5 109.7 
  Self-empl. lab. income 25.3 28.2 23.4 19.2 16.9 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.5 
  Cash transfers 5.3 4.9 4.2 6.5 8.5 
  Other income (ext) 8.2 8.2 7.3 11.0 9.6 
  Interests on mortg. -0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.8 
  Taxes -41.7 -45.0 -44.6 -47.7 -45.7 
ES Labour income 34.2 103.9 99.6 94.6 92.1 
  Self-empl. lab. income 2.5 7.4 7.6 10.8 11.7 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.4 
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  Cash transfers 2.7 7.9 9.6 10.8 11.4 
  Other income (ext) 2.0 5.2 5.9 5.5 4.5 
  Interests on mortg. -0.2 -1.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.6 
  Taxes -8.1 -24.4 -22.7 -21.4 -20.6 
FI Labour income 125.8 121.2 125.1 123.5 115.5 
  Self-empl. lab. income 13.3 16.1 14.2 11.5 10.7 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.6 
  Cash transfers -7.8 -6.3 -6.4 -4.5 -3.5 
  Other income (ext) 25.7 22.3 21.6 20.4 22.3 
  Interests on mortg. -1.8 -2.7 -2.7 -2.0 -1.3 
  Taxes -57.2 -52.5 -53.5 -50.9 -48.6 
FR Labour income 92.1 67.1 68.8 69.8 70.3 
  Self-empl. lab. income 17.9 15.7 15.2 13.0 13.6 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Cash transfers 20.0 19.2 15.8 19.4 18.3 
  Other income (ext) 8.7 30.7 31.9 28.6 30.2 
  Interests on mortg. -1.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 
  Taxes -37.7 -29.0 -31.0 -30.0 -31.8 
GR Labour income 79.5 83.6 77.3 72.1 72.7 
  Self-empl. lab. income 42.8 38.9 40.2 42.9 41.7 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 
  Cash transfers 16.0 16.1 17.3 19.0 17.7 
  Other income (ext) 9.5 8.5 8.2 9.1 8.4 
  Interests on mortg. -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 
  Taxes -47.3 -46.7 -42.9 -42.9 -40.2 
IE Labour income 101.7 105.1 114.2 106.8 . 
  Self-empl. lab. income 32.7 25.7 22.9 14.7 . 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 . 
  Cash transfers -4.2 -2.7 -0.5 8.6 . 
  Other income (ext) 6.3 9.2 5.3 4.3 . 
  Interests on mortg. -2.1 -2.6 -3.5 -2.2 . 
  Taxes -35.1 -35.5 -38.9 -32.5 . 
IT Labour income 73.4 68.6 68.1 68.3 68.1 
  Self-empl. lab. income 41.6 47.8 43.4 45.4 41.5 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
  Cash transfers 23.1 25.7 27.8 27.5 28.9 
  Other income (ext) 6.4 7.4 7.5 6.5 8.0 
  Interests on mortg. -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 
  Taxes -44.2 -49.3 -46.8 -47.6 -47.2 
NL Labour income 118.0 117.0 113.9 122.9 124.1 
  Self-empl. lab. income 19.4 27.4 30.0 28.0 28.5 
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  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.1 
  Cash transfers 14.3 11.3 14.3 14.3 14.0 
  Other income (ext) 13.1 21.1 18.7 11.2 12.5 
  Interests on mortg. -3.0 -6.9 -5.6 -5.1 -5.0 
  Taxes -64.0 -72.4 -74.0 -73.7 -77.3 
PT Labour income 101.2 94.9 94.3 102.4 101.1 
  Self-empl. lab. income 15.9 20.5 19.9 11.9 11.5 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
  Cash transfers 21.4 20.5 19.4 19.2 21.9 
  Other income (ext) 3.2 3.6 4.1 5.3 4.4 
  Interests on mortg. -1.3 -1.3 -1.1 -1.3 -0.6 
  Taxes -41.4 -38.2 -36.7 -37.9 -39.1 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), 
Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), 
Portugal (PT). Contribution of single income sources normalized onto overall inequality (Zenga index = 100). 
 
At the start of the crisis (2008, compared to pre-crisis) a strong increase of inequality explained by 
labour income in Spain and Austria is observed; together with strong reductions in the 
contribution of labour income in France and increases in the contribution of other income to 
overall inequality. After 2008, the contribution of labour income decreased in Spain and Greece and 
it increased in Belgium and the Netherlands. At the same time, the contribution of self-employment 
labour income to overall inequality decreased in Germany. These results appear very much in line 
with the decomposition by sources of the Gini index (see Annex 1 – Table 2A).  
In the light of the considerations above, the effect of individual income sources on overall inequality 
will also depend on which point of the distribution this (extra) source is earned. In other words, it 
may be important to assess the marginal effect of both standard and extra income sources on 
overall inequality measures. In this respect, following our previous discussion in Section 4.2 
(equation 3), the Gini decomposition allows to measure to what extent the observed contributions 
depend on: how (un)equal the distribution of each income source is (𝐺𝑦𝑠); the relative importance 
of each individual component as a share of total income (𝑊𝑦𝑠); the correlation between the 
distribution of aggregate income and that of the individual income component (𝑅𝑦𝑠); allowing to 
calculate marginal effects. Marginal effects here account for the percentage change in inequality 
resulting from a small percentage change in income from a given source, all other things being 
equal. This corresponds to the original contribution of each source to income inequality minus each 
source share on total income. 
The results in Figure 4 show, for instance, that in a country like Spain, a 1% increase in labour 
income contributed to an increase on the inequality computed on total income by about 0.24% in 
2007. Labour income and – to a lesser extent – self-employment labour income and non-cash labour 
income have had a strong un-equalizing effect over time in most countries (except in France and 
Spain). An important un-equalising effect of income from self-employment is observed instead in 
Italy. Cash transfers and taxes consistently acted in favouring people at the lower end of the 
income distribution. Compared to the other income sources, results for the Netherlands show that 
interest on mortgages has had a relatively strong un-equalizing effect on total income. To a much 
lesser extent, a similar pattern is observed in France, Greece, Italy and Spain. In the case of Finland, 
France and the Netherlands, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy and Greece other income sources (including private pension plans) have had an un-
equalizing effect.  
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Figure 4 – Marginal effects 
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5.3 Zooming-in: inequality decomposition by income quantiles 
 
The contribution of each source to the global inequality is related to specific income levels. In what 
follows, we take a closer look at the decomposition of inequality by source, by considering the 
mean contribution for a specific pair quantile-source. In particular, we compare how the relative 
contribution of each income source is distributed across quantiles in 2007 (Fig. 5, left-panels) and 
2011 (Fig. 5, right panels).  
Overall, in both 2007 and 2011, labour income seems to have played a relatively major role in the 
lowest percentiles (20, 40). This picture is different in Portugal (where labour income is high also 
in the top 80%), Greece and Spain (broadly flat). In 2011, relative to 2007, these figures are 
confirmed for most countries again with the exceptions of Spain and Greece, where labour income 
is more heterogeneous across quantiles, Ireland, where labour income became relatively more 
important in the middle of the distribution, and Portugal, where the weight of labour income 
decreases towards the right tail. As far as “other income” is concerned important increases are 
observed in France in 2011, as also confirmed in the previous table with relative contributions.  
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Figure 5 – Index decomposition by quantiles (based on Zenga) 
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5.4 Zooming-in: quantile regressions  
 
With the aim of providing a richer characterization of the data, allowing to consider the impact of 
(some) covariates on the entire distribution of household income (by quantiles), quantile 
regressions are finally run for each country (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2010; Chamberlain, 1994). 
The dependent variable is the (log) total household disposable income for the cross sections of 
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2007 and 2011. As income observations are available at the household level, the exercise is 
performed by looking at the characteristics of a representative individual in each household (head). 
Information about the other individuals in the households is considered as well (number of 
children, head’s partner working status). Importantly these estimates show the relationship 
between covariates and log total disposable income and do not necessarily represent a causal 
relationship. The analysis presented here allows digging into the determinants of income 
inequality, providing a unique country-by-country assessment of the drivers of inequality by 
households’ head characteristics. Such an analysis goes beyond an income decomposition by source 
of the previous sections and rather looks at the significance of household head’s characteristics in 
driving total (household) income (and, again, not its individual components) by quantiles.  
In particular, the proposed approach allows estimating the effect of potential determinants of 
inequality on all parts of the income distribution. An analysis of this type is better suited to answer 
the question about what are the drivers of income inequality. In this exercise, the explanatory 
variables for each country include: Partner employed (=1 if the head’s partner is employed); Number of 
children (i.e. or the total number of people in the household minus the head and other adults); Part-
time Job (=1 if the head has a part-time job); Age groups (=1 if the head is less than 24 years old, =2 if the 
head is between 25 and 39 years old, =3 if the head is between 40 and 54 years old, =4 if the head is 
between 55 and 75 years-olds); Housing tenure/tenure status (=1 if the head is a tenant but he/she does 
not pay rent (beneficiary), =2 if the head is owner of the dwelling, =3 if the head is owner of the 
dwelling but with a mortgage, =4 if the head is a tenant); Educational attainment  (=1 if the head has 
low education, =2 if the head has medium education, =3 if the head has high education).9   
In the analysis, which we limit to a visual inspection, we also plot the conditional mean of 
household disposable income based on a standard OLS regression – using the same set of covariates 
– to show that a more complete picture of covariate effects is provided by estimating a family of 
conditional quantile functions. The interpretation of quantile regression results is similar to that of 
OLS estimates, with the important difference that standard ordinary least square estimates only 
look at the effect of mean income on the overall income distribution.  
In each quantile regression, the first category for each explanatory variable (e.g., low education in 
the case of educational attainment) is omitted, so that the coefficients may be interpreted relative to 
this omitted category. Again, the impact on income of the variables listed above is likely to differ 
across quantiles (e.g. higher education is arguably more valuable for high income households’ heads 
than for low income ones). OLS ignore such heterogeneity as they only provide estimates of the 
mean effect of the covariates (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).  
The Figure below (Figure 6) presents a summary of quantile regression results for some selected 
country examples. The analysis considers 10 covariates, plus an intercept. Again, the quantile 
regression focuses on the quantile of household income conditional on the household’s head 
characteristics. For each of the 10 coefficients, we plot the 19 distinct quantile regression estimates 
with the quantile dimension ranging from 0.05 to 0.95 as the solid curve with filled dots. For each 
covariate, these point estimates are understood as a small change in household’s head 
characteristics in each quantile of the overall distribution. Each of the plots has a horizontal 
quantile scale, and the vertical scale indicates the covariate effect.  
The dashed line in each figure shows the ordinary least squares estimate of the conditional mean 
effect. The two dotted lines represent conventional 90 percent confidence intervals for the least 
squares estimate. The shaded grey area depicts a 90 percent pointwise confidence band for the 
quantile regression estimates. In the first panel of the figure, the intercept of the model may be 
interpreted as the estimated conditional quantile function of the household disposable income 
distribution of a family head whose partner is unemployed, himself/herself with a full-time job, less 
than 24 years old, who is a tenant not paying his/her rent and with low education.  
                                                 
9 Based on ISCED classifications. 
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We will confine our discussion to only a few of the covariates. At any chosen quantile we can ask, 
for example, how different is the corresponding impact on household disposable income, given its 
head characteristics. We start by interpreting the results for 2007 for Germany (DE), Spain (ES) 
and Italy (IT) (Figure 7).  
Having a partner employed is relevant especially at the lower end of the distribution. In the picture, 
family heads to the left of the chart are those with low income. As it can be gauged from the second 
right panel in each Figure, the effect of having a partner employed is always positive, with a 
marginal higher effect for the I quantile. In this case, a downward sloping curve means that a 1 p.p. 
increase in the likelihood of having a partner employed for a family head increases income more at 
the bottom than at the top of the distribution. This effect is monotone in the case of Spain and 
Italy, but it is non-linear in the case of Germany. A high number of children has consistently a 
negative impact on household disposable income (controlling for other factors). In addition, having 
a head with a part-time job is always found to have a negative impact on household disposable 
income. However, the effect is particularly negative for smaller quantiles. Moreover, compared to a 
person less than 24 years old, being between the ages of 25-39, 40-54 or 55-75 does have an 
increasing positive impact of household disposable income, possibly because of the effect of tenure 
on wage. Within each age category, this effect is however downward sloping, with age being a 
more relevant factor at lower quantiles. Being the owner of the dwelling (tenure status = 2) is 
moreover found to have a positive impact on household disposable income and this effect is found 
to decrease by quantiles.  Finally, compared to a head with low education, having medium or high 
education is always found to have a positive effect on income, and this is found to increase every 
time by quantile groups (the richer the household the stronger the effect of education).  
All in all, the homogeneity hypothesis for the 2007 regression results (or the hypothesis that 
quantile regression results are not statistically different from OLS estimates) is rejected in most 
cases, as evidenced by the fact that quantile regression estimates do not stand within the OLS 
estimated confidence bands. This provides an indirect test that going beyond a mean-regression 
approach is useful, validating a quantile regression approach.  
When moving to the results for the 2011 cross-section, the results change quite dramatically and, 
albeit some patterns, as described previously, are preserved, the picture becomes much less clear 
(Figure 7). In particular, while quantiles are still non–linear, the homogeneity hypothesis is not 
rejected in most cases. On the contrary, quantile regression results show a more stable pattern of 
return across quantiles for many of the dummy variables considered, consistent, in this case, with 
OLS estimates. For the three countries under scrutiny, sometimes a big blip for bottom/top-income 
households is found, which only in a few cases is statistically different from linear regression 
estimates. These results suggest that the impact of each covariate on different parts of the income 
distribution has become more “flat” during the crisis. In other words, quantile dispersion, while 
significant in 2007, decreased in 2011, with differences across covariates (head’s individual 
characteristics) becoming not significantly different across quantiles.  This seems to suggest that 
the crisis has “smoothed” the effect of individual household (head’s) characteristics, against other 
factors (i.e. possibly varying income source share and contribution over time).  
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Figure 6 – Quantile regressions (2007) for selected EA countries 
  
(i) Germany (DE) 
 
(ii) Spain (ES)  
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(iii) Italy (IT) 
 
 
Figure 7 – Quantile regressions (2011) for selected EA countries 
  
(i) Germany (DE) 
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(ii) Spain (ES) 
 
(iii) Italy (IT) 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The aim of the paper was to look at how inequality has evolved in some selected euro area countries 
(in alphabetical order: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), 
Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal 
(PT)) since the start of the crisis and – more importantly – to shed some light on which portions of 
the income distribution actually drove the observed dynamics in the aggregate, coupled with an 
analysis of the contribution of the individual income source. Based on household level data from the 
EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), for the cross-sections 2004 to 2011, in the 
paper we showed a broader set of income inequality indicators, where measures used spanned from 
the standard Gini index based on household disposable income – thereby allowing a comparison 
with the results available in the literature – to an alternative indicator, the Zenga index (2007), and 
an extended income definition. The computation of the Zenga (2007) inequality index, allowed us 
to detect deviations from equality in any parts of the distribution, including the left (poorest) and 
the right (richest) parts of the tail, differently from what the Gini index would do. In doing so, the 
Zenga index was first decomposed into the contribution to overall inequality coming from single 
income sources. The rationale behind this exercise was to have a quantitative assessment of 
inequality developments as a result of the economic crisis, especially in those economies which 
were more hardly hit. Secondly, inequality was further analysed with respect to the 
aforementioned extended income definition, including additional income components, some of 
which being particularly relevant in the current conjuncture, such as interest paid on mortgage or 
private pension plans. 
While broadly confirming the distributional effect of the crisis documented in previous studies, we 
found that, in specific countries, the level of inequality appears higher when alternative measures 
are taken into account, and that the rise of inequality since 2008 has not been as modest as 
previous studies would suggest. Exploiting the aforementioned Zenga decomposition, the paper 
finally looked at how the distribution of income has evolved during the crisis by income quantile 
groups (i.e. ‘zooming-in’). An analysis of income inequality at such a granular level was indeed 
made possible by the use of the Zenga index (2007) and its linearity property (see Section 4). The 
results pointed to varying contribution of labour income in 2011 compared to 2007. In addition, 
looking at the effect of household characteristics on the entire distribution of income, we found 
that while the impact of such characteristics showed a non-linear pattern across income quantile 
groups before the crisis; such dispersion has decreased in 2011. This reconciles with the idea that 
the crisis has possibly “smoothed” the effect of individual characteristics, against other factors (e.g., 
varying income source share and contributions over time). We argue, on the basis of our analysis, 
that euro area countries are “differently unequal” in their inequality pattern, particularly when 
single income sources/quantile groups are examined. Any sensible analysis of the distributional 
impact of policies adopted during the crisis – particularly in more vulnerable economies – would 
therefore need to be carried out at a finer level of analysis. 
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Annex 1 Additional Charts and Tables  
 
Figure 1A – Evolution of inequality over the period 2004-11  
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Table 1A – Data coverage  
 
  Income (gross) Disposable income (net) 
2004                     
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
AT 13630 29629.8 24038.3 125.0 917119.9 13630 21460.2 14269.3 100.0 515921.2 
BE 15076 27206.1 21647.2 10.0 848099.3 15076 20332.2 16230.3 0.0 638000.0 
CY 10022 20451.5 16838.1 925.1 717436.4 10022 18321.7 14017.5 95.0 547746.1 
DE 28785 28667.8 22182.8 10.0 527861.1 28785 21325.7 15242.3 2.0 468704.7 
ES 35665 16491.9 10773.3 3.8 132516.7 35665 14054.6 8378.2 3.3 113724.3 
FI 26466 32048.3 23490.9 164.0 654971.3 26466 23552.5 15658.8 118.0 521733.3 
FR 25501 28381.3 25850.2 123.2 1207745.0 25501 23000.9 18029.7 124.0 577813.3 
GR                     
IE 12543 31584.6 28571.9 150.0 501777.7 12543 26639.7 20981.5 120.0 476915.1 
IT 52145 24137.7 19090.8 27.7 562091.3 52145 18150.6 12120.2 55.0 315193.3 
NL 25381 36464.3 26579.9 759.0 1151297.0 25381 23997.5 15523.0 268.5 479948.1 
PT 11786 12397.0 12237.0 333.3 228604.4 11786 9896.0 8458.8 286.7 137971.8 
2005                     
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
AT 5710 29568.2 22762.8 125.0 917119.9 5710 21389.5 13795.9 100.0 515921.2 
BE 6285 26245.4 22323.7 10.0 848099.3 6285 19823.4 16486.0 0.0 638000.0 
CY 3353 19853.9 18708.8 925.1 717436.4 3353 17775.6 15353.4 95.0 547746.1 
DE 13212 28395.4 23078.9 10.0 527861.1 13212 21161.6 15731.1 2.0 468704.7 
ES 12886 16489.1 11176.2 3.8 132516.7 12886 14092.6 8638.4 3.3 113724.3 
FI 10462 31536.3 25061.3 164.0 654971.3 10462 23202.2 16763.4 118.0 521733.3 
FR 10412 28616.6 26698.7 123.2 1207745.0 10412 23278.8 18504.3 124.0 577813.3 
GR                     
IE 5239 29667.6 27834.1 150.0 501777.7 5239 25388.8 20416.9 120.0 476915.1 
IT 20760 23977.7 19791.8 27.7 562091.3 20760 18091.0 12523.8 55.0 315193.3 
NL 10304 36370.1 28033.4 759.0 1151297.0 10304 24070.6 15727.9 268.5 479948.1 
PT 4439 12150.9 12397.0 333.3 228604.4 4439 9837.6 8661.9 286.7 137971.8 
2006                     
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
AT 13606 30424.3 19588.3 20.0 337998.5 13606 22216.9 11880.1 16.0 204100.0 
BE 14678 27981.4 19527.3 19.4 651843.5 14678 21214.9 13722.0 19.4 604689.5 
CY 9281 21248.6 17441.5 1360.0 698266.7 9281 18950.1 14546.8 1040.0 537733.3 
DE 28336 28476.8 20027.9 10.0 518000.0 28336 21355.7 13949.1 10.0 454760.0 
ES 36158 16969.0 11087.7 2.6 183946.7 13524 6523.6 3736.5 2.0 40388.8 
FI 25141 33359.9 23973.7 200.0 688763.0 36158 14592.3 8750.6 2.0 177166.0 
FR 25595 29053.5 26693.5 11.0 1152651.0 25595 23655.5 19740.1 10.0 661973.3 
GR 17855 17303.4 15519.1 30.9 299704.8 17855 13049.2 9922.4 27.8 173684.8 
IE 12631 30941.5 25187.0 4.4 351066.9 12631 25854.8 16546.9 3.3 250374.4 
IT 50962 24881.7 20801.1 2.5 579040.0 50962 18673.0 13221.8 2.5 333388.0 
NL 23640 37882.3 26581.4 1020.0 1412640.0 23640 24539.2 14771.8 263.8 631358.0 
PT 13013 12359.5 12374.0 168.0 247578.7 13013 9969.9 8641.9 168.0 197171.3 
2007                     
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
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AT 5874 30503.0 20565.1 20.0 337998.5 5874 22202.2 12606.1 16.0 204100.0 
BE 6105 27414.9 21707.7 19.4 651843.5 6105 20987.3 15070.3 19.4 604689.5 
CY 3142 20591.2 19657.5 1360.0 698266.7 3142 18402.8 16360.5 1040.0 537733.3 
DE 13024 28124.4 20731.5 10.0 518000.0 13024 21132.2 14273.6 10.0 454760.0 
ES 13087 17064.5 11511.2 2.6 183946.7 13087 14725.5 9059.3 2.0 177166.0 
FI 10123 32699.6 25636.5 200.0 688763.0 10123 24189.7 17109.1 0.0 563315.0 
FR 10595 29545.4 28240.5 11.0 1152651.0 10595 24139.4 20913.3 10.0 661973.3 
GR 6934 16784.1 15568.8 197.0 299704.8 6934 12921.3 9933.2 30.0 173684.8 
IE 5169 29437.0 25270.9 4.4 351066.9 5169 24977.9 17117.2 3.3 250374.4 
IT 20355 24852.6 21745.5 2.5 579040.0 20355 18727.8 13793.2 2.5 333388.0 
NL 9706 37806.0 29369.7 1020.0 1412640.0 9706 24657.0 16043.4 263.8 631358.0 
PT 4949 12223.3 12463.9 168.0 247578.7 4949 9987.1 8762.0 168.0 197171.3 
2008                     
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
AT 14085 32084.2 21850.2 83.8 325500.0 14085 23342.4 12967.4 67.0 204627.4 
BE 14734 28458.6 18074.8 125.0 442721.6 14734 21339.0 12799.0 125.0 424382.7 
CY 11081 21583.9 18325.9 793.3 748666.7 11081 19064.2 15899.5 480.0 709977.3 
DE 27935 28961.2 25262.8 0.7 1644722.0 27935 21567.1 15962.3 68.0 838842.0 
ES 36306 16976.0 11528.5 1.2 152728.3 36306 14629.7 9182.9 0.6 149385.0 
FI 26994 33792.7 25011.0 38.0 686814.0 26994 25252.1 16637.1 0.0 544886.0 
FR 26504 29258.7 23806.7 666.7 883162.0 26504 23938.3 17592.4 180.0 421666.7 
GR 17496 17209.8 15220.5 80.0 244896.1 17496 13118.6 9663.6 0.0 152836.0 
IE 11550 28846.1 29979.5 25.0 850267.0 11550 23515.5 17993.4 0.0 475721.8 
IT 47296 24997.5 21476.9 4.3 994962.9 47296 18811.2 13468.3 4.3 571587.2 
NL 24564 38132.8 24034.2 936.0 1025993.0 24564 24638.7 13140.9 146.0 549589.3 
PT 13368 12375.4 10731.9 207.0 141185.4 13368 10045.1 7407.9 207.0 88236.5 
2009                     
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
AT 6186 32027.6 22372.9 83.8 325500.0 6186 23281.8 13364.9 67.0 204627.4 
BE 6121 27667.5 18876.0 125.0 442721.6 6121 20959.2 13534.0 125.0 424382.7 
CY 3776 20952.3 20043.6 793.3 748666.7 3776 18510.0 17501.2 480.0 709977.3 
DE 13005 28817.3 28235.7 0.7 1644722.0 13005 21516.4 17528.8 68.0 838842.0 
ES 13307 17044.7 11750.7 1.2 152728.3 13307 14744.9 9330.0 0.6 149385.0 
FI 10977 33128.0 26353.5 38.0 686814.0 10977 24824.1 17628.5 0.0 544886.0 
FR 11031 29590.9 24408.8 666.7 883162.0 11031 24272.6 17811.5 180.0 421666.7 
GR 6937 16695.6 15091.1 80.0 244896.1 6937 12980.8 9560.2 80.0 152836.0 
IE 4613 27646.7 26091.4 25.0 850267.0 4613 23040.2 16314.7 0.0 475721.8 
IT 18998 25074.7 21700.8 4.3 994962.9 18998 18930.5 13594.2 4.3 571587.2 
NL 10103 38165.2 25217.5 936.0 1025993.0 10103 24813.5 13742.6 146.0 549589.3 
PT 5166 12175.4 11099.5 207.0 141185.4 5166 10021.8 7707.8 207.0 88236.5 
2010                     
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
AT 13927 32863.6 22361.2 12.5 491750.3 13927 24172.5 13895.8 10.0 292774.2 
BE 14276 28777.8 27172.7 47.6 2529400.0 14276 21861.8 17938.6 47.6 1684067.0 
CY 11438 22603.6 18539.6 645.0 802944.7 11438 19847.3 16294.6 520.0 766834.7 
DE 28580 29618.3 22879.1 31.0 1050177.0 28580 22087.6 15490.7 31.0 587974.0 
ES 34146 16430.8 11121.3 3.1 117600.0 34146 14225.5 8976.1 2.5 117600.0 
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FI 23008 34927.0 33472.5 12.0 2401212.0 23008 26191.6 24463.0 0.0 1888896.0 
FR 27050 30014.7 31820.5 65.0 1311026.0 27050 24342.1 23668.3 60.0 922660.0 
GR 14932 15046.7 12816.8 120.0 263483.2 14932 11591.3 8441.2 0.0 181666.7 
IE 10979 28107.9 22805.9 19.1 361525.1 10979 22776.6 14308.3 15.0 218626.3 
IT 47548 25973.7 29325.6 4.0 1964900.0 47548 19311.2 17528.2 0.0 1091677.0 
NL 25408 38701.0 25936.1 40.0 1323389.0 25408 24628.1 13303.7 40.0 539086.0 
PT 14660 12486.1 11140.1 254.5 154309.6 14660 9985.8 7576.4 254.5 127968.1 
2011                     
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
AT 6183 32729.7 23244.3 12.5 491750.3 6183 24088.1 14438.8 10.0 292774.2 
BE 5895 28338.5 37259.9 47.6 2529400.0 5895 21729.6 24756.3 47.6 1684067.0 
CY 3914 22220.5 20776.7 645.0 802944.7 3914 19522.8 18415.8 520.0 766834.7 
DE 13418 29254.2 23456.8 31.0 1050177.0 13418 21885.9 15848.3 31.0 587974.0 
ES 12841 16556.2 11462.1 3.1 117600.0 12841 14401.4 9217.9 2.5 117600.0 
FI 9343 34319.1 37349.4 12.0 2401212.0 9343 25858.4 27602.8 0.0 1888896.0 
FR 11345 30302.4 30398.2 65.0 1311026.0 11345 24694.3 22446.3 60.0 922660.0 
GR 5942 14644.5 12788.1 120.0 263483.2 5942 11403.5 8422.1 0.0 181666.7 
IE           
IT 19227 26093.7 28698.4 4.0 1964900.0 19227 19495.1 17293.8 0.0 1091677.0 
NL 10469 38735.2 27112.2 40.0 1323389.0 10469 24793.1 13936.7 40.0 539086.0 
PT 5725 12383.8 11554.0 254.5 154309.6 5725 10033.8 7900.0 254.5 127968.1 
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Table 2A – Contribution of income sources – net extended income (Gini index=100) 
 
    2005-2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
AT Labour income 101.1 112.7 110.2 115.1 108.4 
  Self-empl. lab. income 21.2 17.8 22.2 21.1 19.3 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Cash transfers 20.3 15.9 13.7 11.7 15.9 
  Other income (ext) 6.2 9.4 7.3 8.7 10.1 
  Interests on mortg. -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 
  Taxes -48.7 -55.2 -52.9 -56.0 -53.7 
BE Labour income 134.7 125.2 131.9 129.9 136.4 
  Self-empl. lab. income 16.9 22.1 13.3 12.0 14.9 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 
  Cash transfers -7.6 -6.6 -4.2 -3.3 -7.9 
  Other income (ext) 12.4 9.5 9.5 12.4 8.9 
  Interests on mortg. -1.8 -1.9 -1.9 -2.1 -2.3 
  Taxes -55.6 -49.4 -49.9 -50.0 -52.1 
CY Labour income 90.8 91.0 90.3 95.0 95.0 
  Self-empl. lab. income 12.0 13.9 12.2 11.3 10.1 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 
  Cash transfers 5.1 5.3 8.9 8.1 7.6 
  Other income (ext) 8.9 7.4 7.2 6.0 7.5 
  Interests on mortg. . -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
  Taxes -16.8 -16.8 -17.7 -19.5 -20.3 
DE Labour income 106.6 106.6 112.7 115.3 114.0 
  Self-empl. lab. income 25.2 27.9 22.8 18.8 16.9 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 
  Cash transfers 2.9 2.6 1.7 4.6 6.5 
  Other income (ext) 8.4 8.4 7.5 10.9 9.6 
  Interests on mortg. -0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.7 
  Taxes -44.4 -47.7 -46.9 -50.0 -48.1 
ES Labour income 70.0 107.6 103.7 99.5 95.5 
  Self-empl. lab. income 5.8 6.7 7.0 10.1 11.3 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 
  Cash transfers 3.8 6.2 7.5 8.0 9.8 
  Other income (ext) 3.3 5.4 5.8 5.5 4.5 
  Interests on mortg. . -1.3 -1.1 -1.0 -0.8 
  Taxes -16.3 -25.6 -23.6 -22.8 -21.7 
FI Labour income 132.3 126.7 130.4 129.6 121.6 
  Self-empl. lab. income 13.5 16.3 14.5 11.4 11.2 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.7 
  Cash transfers -11.4 -9.1 -9.4 -7.5 -7.0 
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  Other income (ext) 24.5 21.1 20.6 19.3 21.1 
  Interests on mortg. -1.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.1 -1.4 
  Taxes -59.1 -54.4 -55.3 -52.8 -50.4 
FR Labour income 93.3 66.7 68.0 70.1 70.2 
  Self-empl. lab. income 17.5 16.0 15.9 13.1 13.9 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Cash transfers 19.9 18.8 15.7 18.6 18.1 
  Other income (ext) 9.0 31.4 32.7 29.4 30.8 
  Interests on mortg. -1.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 
  Taxes -38.5 -29.4 -31.5 -30.5 -32.4 
GR Labour income 82.9 85.2 81.6 76.4 76.5 
  Self-empl. lab. income 42.2 39.4 39.3 42.2 39.2 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  Cash transfers 15.4 16.1 16.3 16.2 16.7 
  Other income (ext) 10.1 8.8 8.6 9.7 9.3 
  Interests on mortg. -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 
  Taxes -50.1 -49.0 -45.5 -44.3 -41.4 
IE Labour income 106.4 110.4 120.0 112.5 . 
  Self-empl. lab. income 32.0 25.2 23.2 15.5 . 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5 . 
  Cash transfers -6.1 -5.6 -4.8 4.6 . 
  Other income (ext) 6.4 9.3 5.6 4.4 . 
  Interests on mortg. -2.2 -2.6 -3.6 -2.5 . 
  Taxes -37.1 -37.5 -40.8 -34.9 . 
IT Labour income 75.4 70.9 70.6 70.1 70.6 
  Self-empl. lab. income 41.7 47.5 43.4 44.8 42.0 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  Cash transfers 22.2 24.7 26.5 26.9 27.5 
  Other income (ext) 6.6 7.6 7.8 6.9 8.2 
  Interests on mortg. -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 
  Taxes -45.5 -50.6 -48.2 -48.6 -48.8 
NL Labour income 121.7 119.7 118.6 126.8 127.3 
  Self-empl. lab. income 20.8 28.5 30.2 27.9 29.0 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.2 
  Cash transfers 12.4 10.7 12.5 13.4 13.5 
  Other income (ext) 12.6 20.5 18.4 11.1 12.1 
  Interests on mortg. -3.4 -7.0 -6.0 -5.5 -5.7 
  Taxes -66.5 -75.1 -76.6 -76.2 -79.4 
PT Labour income 102.5 96.7 96.3 104.7 103.9 
  Self-empl. lab. income 16.0 20.9 20.1 12.3 12.1 
  Non-cash lab. income (ext) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
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  Cash transfers 21.3 20.6 18.7 18.1 21.2 
  Other income (ext) 3.2 3.7 4.4 5.5 4.4 
  Interests on mortg. -1.3 -1.6 -1.1 -1.3 -1.0 
  Taxes -42.7 -40.3 -38.5 -39.6 -41.4 
Note: The euro area countries considered are (in alphabetical order) Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), 
Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), 
Portugal (PT). Contribution of single income sources normalized onto overall inequality (Gini index = 100).  
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Annex 2 Treatment of ‘residuals’ 
 
As discussed in our data Section, consistent with the assumption of income (whether gross or net) 
adding up to the sum of the individual income sources, a residual component is included in the 
contribution of income components to aggregate income. Here, the residual component represents 
the part of income which is not accounted for by the available income decomposition sources in the 
EU-SILC (i.e. the sum of individual income sources does not always add up to total household 
income, as in Table 1).  
There might be a number of reasons why one should expect such a discrepancy measure to appear 
in the data. First, survey answers may go wrong as people can forget, make mistakes or simply do 
not respond. Secondly, people may be reluctant to disclose the full extent of their income (e.g., 
coming from illegal activities, tax evasion, etc.). Finally, some parts of income, retained profits 
and/or related costs may be difficult to quantify (see also World Bank, 2001). In our analysis, such a 
discrepancy results in an observed income indicator which contains an additive error term. This 
may cast some doubts on the interpretation of the income sources and the decomposition exercise 
outlined previously.  
In order to test for the statistical significance of the residual and investigate the robustness of our 
results to such a ‘residual’ component, we estimate bootstrapped confidence bands for the Gini 
coefficient in each country. The bootstrapped standard errors and estimates for Gini inequality 
index are calculated on total income. The Gini coefficient so obtained, together with bootstrapped 
two-standard errors confidence bands, is plotted against the Gini coefficient calculated as the sum 
of the individual income components. The divergence between the two is simply explained by the 
existence of a ‘residual’. Hence, the possibility that the Gini index calculated on the sum of the 
income sources falls in between the bootstrapped confidence bands for the Gini calculated on total 
income provides an indirect test for the statistical significance of the residual in our series. The 
Gini coefficient calculated on the sum of the income components gets, in all cases, close to the 
index calculated on total income series, soundly rejecting the hypothesis that the residual is 
statistically significant. Nonetheless, it is less so for Spain for the years 2004 and 2005, where the 
Gini coefficient calculated on the sum of the individual income sources moves away from the one 
calculated on total income and outside the estimated confidence bands.  
Overall, however, also in the case of Spain the pattern that emerges from leaving the residual in the 
income decomposition exercise differs negligibly from an analysis where the residual is spread onto 
the other income components, in proportion to each component contribution to the overall income. 
Hence, the analysis is performed without considering an explicit ‘residual’ component in the 
decomposition exercise by income sources. 
 
